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ABSTRACT
Global derivatives activity continues to expand although they have provided some of the most
devastating financial disasters. 
The debate on their regulation has always been present and is still unresolved. However,
without undervaluing the importance of regulation and the usefulness of an adequate external
control, a sound internal control system is essential to prevent new financial scandals. 
First of all, this paper, through the review of existing recommendations, rules, regulation and
academic literature, studies and analyses the need and importance of internal control in
derivative usage for risk management. And secondly, through a questionnaire about
established policies, procedures and internal controls, it provides evidence related to its
usage and control by Spanish savings banks. 
KEY WORDS: Derivatives, Internal Control, Risk Management, Financial Firms,
Savings Banks. 
JEL: M4, G21
RESUMEN
El uso de los derivados sigue en expansión a pesar de haber ocasionado alguno de los mayores
escándalos financieros. 
El debate sobre su regulación, todavía sin resolver, ha estado siempre presente. No obstante,
y sin menospreciar la importancia de la regulación y la utilidad de un adecuado control
externo, un buen sistema de control interno es esencial para prevenir nuevos desastres. 
Este trabajo, en primer lugar, a través de la revisión de las recomendaciones, normas,
regulación y literatura académica existente, estudia y analiza la necesidad e importancia del
control interno en el uso de los derivados para la gestión del riesgo. Y en segundo lugar, a
través de un cuestionario sobre las políticas, procedimientos y controles internos establecidos,
aporta evidencia sobre el uso y control de los mismos por las cajas de ahorros españolas. 
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INTRODUCTION*
When used properly, derivatives are among useful tools for financial risk management,
providing financial firms more business avenues while making it possible for a more
flexible and efficient risk management. On the other hand, when used incorrectly they can
turn into a new and dangerous source of risk, which could go as far as destroying the
company that uses them, as occurred with the Barings Bank (1995), or cause substantial
losses as in the well known cases of Daiwa (1995), AIB (2002), NAB (2004), more recently
Société Générale (2007) and a long list of financial scandals. We have focused our
research on these disasters linked to derivatives as financial firms consider the need to
control them.
Irrespective of existing regulation and control procedures for use of derivatives, it is
important that internal control mechanisms in a company derivative usage be explored to
add missing knowledge literature.
Without undervaluing the importance of regulation and the usefulness of an adequate external
control (Romano, 1998; Burns, 1998; Dood, 2000), which on occasions only add limitations
to the market (Cooper, 1994; Schachter, 1994; Gibson and Zimmermann, 1994; Culp and
Mackay, 1997; Siems, 1997; Miller, 1996; Malcolm, Sharma y Tanega, 1999), we believe that
it is the internal control which can best assure the adequate use of these instruments. 
In our view, only a flexible and sound internal control system allows adaptation to the
dynamism of these instruments. The correct identification and setting up of adequate
internal control are mechanisms that should be present in the development of new
activities of financial firms particularly in transactions with derivatives to avoid new
problems or losses such as those encountered in the past. 
This paper follows two main objectives. First of all, to study and analyse the importance
and the need of internal control in derivatives usage. For this purpose, we review the main
recommendations, rules, norms, regulation issued and the academic literature related. 
And secondly, to survey the usage and control of derivatives by Spanish savings banks. For
this purpose, we sent a questionnaire which provides evidence related to policies,
procedures and controls established. 
The rest of the paper is as follows: section 2 briefly describes the position of Spanish
savings banks as derivative end-users which have played an active role in the development
of the country’s banking industry; sections 3 and 4 review the numerous published reports
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on risk management and control of derivatives and the literature pertinent to the use and
control of derivatives; and sections 5 and 6 describe the research design and summarises
the survey results followed by further analysis and discussion, and some concluding
remarks in section 7.
THE ROLE OF SAVINGS BANKS IN SPAIN
As derivatives are classified as off-balance sheet activities, its dramatic growth has not
been registered on balance sheets of banks. However, it is generally accepted that not all
banks use them and that this activity is highly concentrated1. 
We can expect a positive relationship between bank size and the use of derivatives as was
found by Sinkey and Carter (2000). Their finding confirmed earlier research which
documented the importance of the size of banks in relation to the use of futures
(Koppenhaver, 1990), swaps (Kim and Koppenhaver, 1993), and interest-rate derivatives
(Carter and Sinkey, 1998a, 1998b; Gunther and Siems, 1996). Even in studies of non-
banking industry virtually all empirical research report a positive relation between
company size and derivatives usage (Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Mian, 1996;
Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; Géczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; Colquitt and Hoyt, 1997).
Unfortunately such detailed data are unavailable for Spain despite the development
banking sector towards modernisation with savings banks in particular playing an active
part. The Spanish savings banks with a history of almost two centuries form an important
group of financial institutions with exceptional distinguishing features. They were founded
with a clear regional objective of attending to the needs of families and businesses within
their territories. At present, there are 46 savings banks in Spain. These firms are
characterised in legal terms as a special form of private foundation2. Unlike other credit
entities, the savings banks combine their financial function with intense social activity.
It has been a bit more than 30 years since the savings banks were equated with commercial
banks in operating terms (RD 2290/1977), opening a new scenario in the Spanish banking
system. This equalisation was an impetus for the savings banks, which had to make their
financial objectives compatible with their social aims in keeping with their special character.
During this period, Spanish savings banks increased their competitiveness and their
market share rose relative to commercial banks. They have gone from representing a
quarter of the Spanish banking system to almost half and since 2003 they have even
2
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(1) According to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC, 2005), at the third quarter of 2005, five
US commercial banks account for 96% of the total notional value of derivatives in the commercial banking
system, with more than 99% held by the largest 25 banks.
(2) The Finance Act (2002) guarantees that civil society continues to play a significant role in governing
bodies and thereby assures the maintenance of the savings bank model that has been so successful in Spain.
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overcome commercial banks in total deposits. They have developed their traditional
activities what along with an increasing diversification into financial services resulting in
a significant commitment to the society. At the same time, they have more than adequate
levels of profitability, efficiency and solvency despite being unable to issue shares. They
have no difficulty in increasing their capital base to date and have always maintained
higher BIS capital adequacy ratio than commercial banks. 
This capital increasing trend may be observed in Table 1, which shows the development of
the most representative off-balance sheet transactions of the banking systems as a whole
(including the savings banks) and the savings banks between 1996-2002 when a more
marked increase in such transactions occurred: particularly, the importance acquired by
transactions with use of derivatives including futures. This has multiplied by 2.3 in the
sector as a whole (exceeding €2 billion in 2002) and within the savings banks by 14.2
(€0.6 billion in 2002).
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TABLE 1.- BANKING SYSTEM AND SAVINGS BANKS (1996-2002): 
OFF-BALANCE SHEET BUSINESS (EURO MILLIONS)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Banking System
Guarantees 1,068 1,215 1,531 5,712 4,449 5,511 5,629
Loan commitments 101,949 115,712 130,558 153,916 170,117 200,496 217,052
Futures 962,463 1,125,350 1,129,627 1,478,866 1,686,038 2,203,552 2,212,156
Savings Banks
Guarantees 302 393 514 756 974 1,125 1,528
Loan commitments 26,661 33,354 39,124 47,618 61,650 72,428 87,494
Futures 44,189 65,495 118,767 208,882 362,508 520,037 626,098
Source: Bank of Spain, European Central Bank, National Stock Market Commission, AEB and CECA
Along with competitive pressures faced by the banking sector, the savings banks have
also had to contend with major regulatory challenges particularly those referring to the
control of risks and, more specifically, the regulation of capital and reserves. However,
their continuing willingness to improve their systems and attitude to the risks they face
is remarkable.
Finally, we would like to point out that, although it would be a mistake to think that savings
banks will go on increasing their share indefinitely, it is fairly reasonable to assume that
within a decade savings banks will go on competing fiercely in the market despite greater
cooperation than before, and with a management oriented towards improvements in
efficiency, risk management, technological innovation and customer relations.
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CONTROL OF DERIVATIVES AS A RISK MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENT
If used cautiously, derivatives assist in stabilising flows by reducing or eliminating the
impact of market variables as shown in studies among others, Rahnema (1991), Nance,
Smith and Smithson (1993), Bodnar et al. (1995, 1996, 1998 and 1999), Phillips (1995),
Yanagida and Inui (1996), Downie, Mcmillan and Nosal (1996), Costa (1995), Alcarria
(1995), Rubín (1996), Mian (1996), Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Tufano (1996),
Venkatachalam (1996), Berkman, Bradbury and Magan (1997), Geczy et al. (1997), Grant
and Marshall (1997), Goldberg et al. (1998), Guay (1999), Levich, Hayt and Ripston
(1999) and De Ceuster, Laveren and Lodewyckx (2000).
In the same way that they help in reducing or eliminating unwanted risks3, they also
contribute in creating other highly risky situations which should be carefully overseen.
Some authors have even defined them as ‘examples of capitalist casinos, lethal poison
for an already chaotic financial market’ (Burns4, 1998). Both financial and non-financial
firms have made significant profits thanks to these instruments, but they have also
suffered losses5, some of which were substantial and generally due to the inadequate use
of the instruments. In short, as Ciborra (2006) argues for digital technologies,
derivatives contribute to both the generation of new side effects and further reflexivity6.
Managing risks thanks to derivatives also makes one vulnerable to events emerging from
new risks.
Despite the various studies showing that derivatives usage can increase firm value
(Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; Goldberg et al., 1998)
because they reduce contracting costs (Mayers and Smith, 1987), financial distress7
costs (Mayers and Smith, 1982; Smith and Stultz, 1985; Froot Scharfstein and Stein,
1993), imperfect access to external capital markets (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993),
agency costs (Mayers and Smith, 1987) and expected taxes (Smith and Stultz 1985;
Mayers and Smith, 1987).
3
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(3) Guay (1999) demonstrates empirically that the use of derivatives does not increase the volatility of the
markets as proven by Jorion (1997), but rather it reduces the level of risk in the companies that use them.
Board et al. (1997) also show in their study that derivative markets do not imply per se, an increase in risk
as claimed on many occasions, because they do not increase volatility, encourage speculation, reduce market
liquidity, or automatically require a higher regulation than other tools to control its use.
(4) Multimillionaire investor Warren Buffet, known as the ‘Oracle of Omaha’ because of his opinions on
financial markets, stated in a letter sent to his shareholders that derivatives were ‘financial weapons of mass
destruction’ which constitutes a ‘potentially lethal threat’ for the economy. He added that the signatories of
derivative contracts had ‘enormous incentives to cheat in the accounting’ because there is no real market for
many of the products, created on the basis of ‘imaginative premises’. Expansion, 7 March 2003.
(5) Miller (1996) argued that these losses do not represent a direct social loss but are only a wealth transfer
between the counter-parties.
(6) By reflexivity Ciborra refers to the fact that every new technology or regulatory measure aimed at
controlling risks such as the grid technologies, inevitably create new risks, which originate from regions
beyond the control of the new powerful platforms.
(7) According to Sinkey and Carter (1997) the notion that risk management reduces the costs of financial
distress may not apply to banking institutions. Owing to federal deposit guarantees, banks are not subject to
the same market discipline as other firms, and as such, they may not benefit from hedging to the same extent
as non-financial firms.
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Triggered by early infamous disasters, some of which are included in Table 2, concerns on
the impact and effects of increased usage have led to numerous debates and publications
on risk and control management systems, risk measuring systems, problems related to
accounting treatment and presentation and disclosure requirements on derivatives activity. 
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TABLE 2.- TOP DERIVATIVES SCANDALS
Company (date) Financial instrument Responsible Risk Total loss*
Bank Negara (1992-1993) Forwards and currency options Several traders Market 3,000
Kashima Oil (1993) Currency forwards Treasury Market 1,450
Operational
Metallgesellchaft (1993) Oil futures Filial estadounidense: Market
MGRM Operational
Liquidity 1,340
Showa Shell Sekiyu (1993) Currency forwards Treasury Market 1,050
Operational
Orange County (1994) Mortgage backed securities Robert Citron Market 1,640
Operational
Procter and Gamble (1994) Currency and interest rate swaps Treasury Market 157
Operational
Gibson Greetings (1994) Caps and interest rate swap-option Treasury Market
Operational 73
Barings Bank (1995) Futures Nick Leeson Market
Operational 1,330
Liquidity
Daiwa (1995) Interest rate derivatives Toshihide Iguchi Market
Operational 1,100
Sumitomo Corporation Commodity futures and options Yasuo Hamanaka Market 
(1996) Operational 2,600
Liquidity
Long Term Capital Interest rate swaps John Meriwheter Market
Management (1998) Operational 4,500
Liquidity
Soros Investment Current positions and forwards Stanley Druckenmiller Market
Management (2000) Credit 2,000
Liquidity
Allied Irish Bank (2002) Currency derivatives John Rusnak Market
Operational 700
Liquidity
National Australian Currency derivatives Four traders Market
Bank (2004) Operational 280
Liquidity
Société Générale (2007) Futures A trader Market 7,350
Operational
Source: Adapted from Aragonés and Blanco (2000).
(*) US$ millions 
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Some of the problems in these cases may be attributed to transaction complexities or
strategies pursued but there were other causes in the majority of cases that sparked off the
scandals. We highlight the following four:
- Various departments (front, middle and back office functions) within the companies
progressing at different speeds during the derivatives product life cycle. Meanwhile the
front office in continuous evolution introduced new as well as combinations of
instruments  to respond to market needs, but their control was not updated.
- The lack of policies, procedures, reporting systems or the existence of an appropriate
organising structure; in short, inadequate or inappropriate management.
- Mistakes or lack of internal control systems of companies.
- Inadequate knowledge or misunderstanding on risks associated with derivatives.
However, in recent years numerous reports on management and risk control of derivatives
have been published (see Table 3). Two, in particular, have contributed towards its
improvement, serving as an essential reference for the rest and leaving a mark on the other
contributions made. They are:
- The well-known Derivatives: Practices and principles8 by the Group of Thirty (G30) in
July 1993 made 20 recommendations for both dealers and end-users on management
and control of derivatives.
- Risk management guidelines for derivatives jointly drawn up by Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS) and IOSCO in 1994, and principally aimed at banking organisations.
The debate on regulation of derivatives or lack of it has always been present and it is still
unresolved. There are many authors who oppose its regulation, believing and arguing that
the disadvantages of an irregular or inappropriate regulation exceed the potential losses
they may cause (Cooper, 1994; Schachter 1994; Gibson and Zimmermann, 1994; Culp and
Mackay, 1997; Siems, 1997; Miller, 1996; Malcolm, Sharma and Tanega, 1999), or that at
least, if there is regulation, to focus it on strengthening the internal mechanisms of control
and risk management (Phillips, 1998).
Internal Control of Derivatives Usage by Spanish Savings Banks
(8) Founded in 1978, G30 is a non-profit organisation of senior executives, regulators and academics which
seek to deepen understanding of international economic and financial issues through meetings and
publications. 
In the early 1990s, there was intensive debate in the United States and other countries on risks posed by
the rapidly growing – and largely unregulated – OTC derivatives market. In mid-1992, G30 chair Paul Volker,
approached JP Morgan chair Dennis Weatherstone to lead a study of derivatives industry practices resulting
in the 68-page G30 report on derivatives. Most of its recommendations are applicable to the risks associated
with other traded instruments. For this reason the report largely came to define the emerging field of financial
risk management in the 1990s. 
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TABLE 3.- RISK MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL DOCUMENTS
Body regulators Document Date
Office of the Comptroller Circular on risk management November 1993
of the Currency (OCC) for financial derivatives (BC-277)
Q & A supplement May 1994
Examination manual on risk management October 1994
of financial derivatives
Federal Reserve Board Examination memo on risk management 
and internal controls for trading activities December 1993
of banking organisations
Letter on evaluating the risk management and 
internal controls of securities and derivative March 1995
contracts used in non-trading activities (SR-95-17)
Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) / Commodity Futures Trading OTC derivatives oversight February 1994
Commission (CFTC)/Securities and 
Investments Board (SIB)
Federal Deposit Insurance Examination guidance for financial derivatives May 1994
Corporation (FDICIA)
General Accounting Office (GAO) Report on financial derivatives May 1994
U
SA
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Risk management guidelines for derivatives July 1994
International Organisation of Operational financial risk management control
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) mechanisms for OTC derivatives activities of July 1994
regulated securities firms
IN
T
E
R
N
A
-
T
IO
N
A
L
Office of Superintendent Financial institutions’ derivatives best practices May 1995
of Canadian (OFSC)
Bank Negara Malaysia Statement on applications by commercial banks January 1995
to offer or trade derivative instruments
Bank of England Report of the Board of Banking Supervision 
Inquiry into the circumstances of the collapse July 1995
of Barings Bank
Hong Kong Monetary Authority Derivatives trading internal control review March 1995
Guideline on risk management of derivatives March 1996
and other traded instruments
Management, supervision and internal control May 1997
guidelines for persons registered with or licensed 
by the securities and futures commission
O
T
H
E
R
S
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However, there are also those who consider that the solution to the problem of derivatives
is greater regulation and external control (Romano, 1998; Burns, 1998; Dood, 2000),
basing their argument on the clarity of communication as the key to avoiding global failure
of the system.
In their study of derivatives regulation, Culp and Mackay (1997) state that regulators and
legislators’ insufficient understanding of the nature of derivatives and risk management
may cause an increase in regulatory risk, that is, inappropriate regulations risks.
On the other hand, Board et al. (1997) consider that as internal and external auditors are
being converted into mechanisms for regulation, and that self-regulation and internal control
are being reassessed favourably to the point of replacing regulation, this can only lead to
reduced information in audit reports which would in turn lessen their value for the company
and the regulators.
Legislation does not always work (Berry, Broadbent and Otley, 1995) but neither can the
ethical dimension that surrounds the existence of regulation, or lack of it, be avoided.
Regulation is necessary in many cases, not only to control but also to provide a framework
of sanctions applicable to those who contravene the law.
Regulation and external control serve their purpose as long as they respect the
organisations’ culture and the environment where they are to operate. In recent years
Internal Control of Derivatives Usage by Spanish Savings Banks
TABLE 3 (CONTINUATION).- RISK MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL DOCUMENTS
Trade associations and private bodies Documents Date
Group of Thirty (G30) Derivatives: Practices and principles July 1993
American Institute of Certified Financial instruments task force detailed June 1994
questions about derivatives
Government Finance Officers Recommended procedures for use of derivatives July 1994
Associations (GFOA) by state and local governments
Investment Company Institute (ICI) Memorandum on investments in derivatives August 1994
by registered investment companies
Futures and Options Association (FOA) Managing derivatives risk: Guidelines for December 1995
end-users of derivatives Updated in 
August 2002
Association of Corporate Treasurers (ACT) Financial risk and internal control March 1993
Guide to risk management and control of derivatives 1994
Derivatives Policy Group (DPG) Framework for voluntary oversight March 1995
Treasury Management Associations (TMA) Principles and practices for the oversight & March 1998
management of financial risk
International Association of Insurance Supervisory standard on derivatives (SS-3) October 1998
Supervisors (IAIS)
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various authorities and international bodies, given the deficiencies found and the results
obtained, have drawn up several reports on the regulation and establishment of internal
control. Some of these reports (see Table 4) have been hovering around financial firms
awaiting the placement of a homogeneous system for the whole sector.
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TABLE 4.- INTERNAL CONTROL DOCUMENTS
Trade associations and private bodies Documents Date
Committee of Sponsoring Organisations Internal control - integrated framework COSO Report September 1992
of the Treadway Commission COSO enterprise risk management. September 2004
Integrated framework
Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation Standards of sound business and financial practices: August 1993
Internal control
Canadian Institute of Chartered Guidance on control November 1995
Accountants (CICA) Guidance on assessing control. The CoCo principles 1997
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Internal control. Guidance for directors on the September 1999
England and Wales (ICAEW) Combined Code (Turnbull Guide)
Body regulators Documents Date
Banco de España, Asociación Española Consideraciones sobre los Sistemas de Control February 1997
de Banca (AEB) and Confederación Interno para la Actividad de Tesorería
Española de Cajas de Ahorros (CECA)
Bank of England Banks internal controls and the section 39 process February 1997
European Monetary Institute (EMI) Internal control systems of credit institutions July 1997
International Organisation of Securities Risk management and control guidance for May 1998
Commissions (IOSCO) securities and their supervision
Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores Circular1/1998 sobre Sistemas Internos de Control, June 1998
Seguimiento y Evaluación Continuada de Riesgos
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Framework for internal control systems in September 1998
banking organisations
Office of the Comptroller of Internal control. A guide for directors September 2000
the Currency (OCC)
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Section 404 - Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002
Malcolm, Sharma and Tanega (1999) state that these best practices, recommendations or
regulations, although they would undoubtedly help, should not be a means to an end.
Moreover, in spite of their possible advantages, the higher the level of regulation and
external requirements, the higher will be the pressure withstood by company management,
and this situation will always end with negative repercussions on the organisations.
Thus, the solution in the first place, apart from regulation and external control, is the
existence of an efficient system of internal control in the organisation, drawn and
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supervised by a capable and efficient internal audit, which can provide assurance
services, ensure the correct functioning of this operation and guarantee the company
management appropriate internal control.
In this sense, many national corporate governance reports include recommendations for
internal control, and reporting on internal controls. Maijoor (2000) asserts that the most
important joint development in Power’s 1997 book, with the audit explosion, is the rise of
internal control systems labelled as the internal control explosion. The concept of
internal control is receiving increasing attention in public policy debates on auditing and
corporate governance. 
Undoubtedly, the existence of an effective and efficient internal control is an essential
component in any financial firm’s management. Because, as Spira and Page (2003) argue,
the redefinition of internal control as risk management emphasises links to strategy
formulation and characterises internal control as a support for enterprise. Having adequate
systems of internal control helps the organisations achieve their objectives whilst avoiding
unnecessary risks.
This can be seen in recent changes to the US internal control rules contained in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 2002 or the UK internal control frameworks beginning with the Cadbury9
Commission 1992 and more recently the Combined Code10 in 1999, which advocate strong
internal control systems to manage and control risks undertaken by the company.
In recent years, financial firms together with bank supervisors around the world, and
particularly the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS), which asked banks for
stricter internal controls to avoid new scandals, have attached more importance to the
existence of good internal control. This increasing interest is partly due to the demise or
considerable losses suffered by various banks. An in-depth analysis of the problems11
linked to those losses shows that a substantial part of the losses could have been avoided
if the banks had had the proper controls, which could have averted or alerted them to the
problems caused by those losses.
So that, we maintain that the problem does not reside so much in the complexity of the
instruments which does exist, but in the capacity to manage and control both the instruments
as such and the risks that their use entails. The systems of self-regulation and internal control
are probably the best way to control them and are thus the centre of our research.
Internal Control of Derivatives Usage by Spanish Savings Banks
(9) Power (1997: 54-57) illustrates his argument on the rise of internal control with the case of the Cadbury
Code which includes recommendations for the responsibilities of directors and auditors regarding internal
control systems.
(10) The final component of the Combined Code was the guidance for directors reporting on internal control
issued by the Turnbull committee in 1999.
(11) See Bank of England (1995) for the Banking Supervision Council’s report on the circumstances that led
to the bankruptcy of Barings. 
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However, as many of these authors have exposed, the concept of “internal control” has
embedded many difficulties added.
Power (1997) observes that despite the increased public attention on internal controls, the
concept is still vague, and there is much confusion in practice about what internal controls
actually are. Maijoor (2000) explores12 the difficulty of defining internal control and
discusses the implications of this lack of clarity for the development of corporate
governance policy and European financial auditing markets. And later on, Spira and Page
(2003) discuss the difficulty of defining internal control, trace its role in the development
of UK corporate governance policy and identify those groups who benefit from the
redefinition of internal control as risk management.
Taking this into account, and with the aim of surveying the internal control of derivatives
by Spanish savings banks, we analyse and study in depth all the documents and
recommendations previously mentioned to know what could be considered as a “sound
internal control” to prepare the questionnaire. The main results are summarised in the
next section 6.
RELATED LITERATURE ON INTERNAL CONTROL OF DERIVATIVES
Although there is little empirical evidence on how financial firms use derivatives to
manage their risks, in recent years researchers have achieved a better understanding
about how these products work, why firms use or do not use them (proms and cons13),
for what purposes (i.e. hedge or speculative reasons) and the sort of firms that use
them (i.e. size14).
However, there are still few studies referred to the internal control of derivatives usage but
those from an external auditing perspective which are mainly concerned with lower level
controls related to specific cycles, processes and transactions. 
Furthermore, Tufano (1996) states firms reveal little information and provide few details
on their risk policies, which is why the majority of the studies carried out rely on the fourth
source of information identified by Anthony (1990), i.e. the survey results and other
complementary information that, at best, distinguish between the firms that use or do not
use a specific type of derivative.
4
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(12) He identifies three perspectives on internal control in academic literature – external audit, organization
theory and economics – noting that the unclear boundaries of the concept of internal control appear to some
extent in academic accounting literature
(13) Booth et al. (1984) found that smaller banks have a problem hiring and retaining skilled employees
needed for an effective risk management program.
(14) Sinkey and Carter (2000) argue that as only a relatively small number of banks are in the position to be
major dealers of risk management/derivatives products, the remaining banks are in the derivatives market
primarily as end-users: to hedge against or speculate on the movement of economic variables.
127-164Internal_control  21/5/08  13:31  Página 138
139Internal Control of Derivatives Usage by Spanish Savings Banks
TABLE 5.- RELATED LITERATURE
Author (Date) Publication Data Sample Research 
Resource (date) area
Rahnema (1991) Utilisation of off-balance-sheet hedging Survey 250 firms Europe
instruments in European firms (31.6% returns)
Nance et al. (1993) On the determinants of corporate hedging Survey (36.3%) 535 – no financial USA
firms (1986)
Phillips (1995) 1995 Derivatives practices and Survey (18.9%) 3,480  TMA USA
instruments survey members (1994)
Costa (1995) Estudio de las prácticas de utilización y Two sets of 121 financial Spain
contabilización de derivados en las firmas questionnaires  intermediates
industriales y comerciales en España (35.54% and 180 – no 
26.11%) financial firms
Alcarria (1995) Estudio empírico: la posición de los Questionnaire 225 – no Spain
profesionales contables y financieros (15.6% and financial firms y 
(Tesis doctoral) 21.1%) 175 financial firms
Bodnar et al. Wharton survey of derivatives usage by US Survey (26.5%) 2,000 – no financial USA
(1996) non-financial firms firms (1994)
Yanagida & Inui Survey of derivatives usage among non Survey No financial firms Japan
(1996) financial Japanese firms
Rubín (1996) Estudio empírico sobre contabilización Financial 47 banks & 35 Spain
y control de derivados (PhD thesis) statements savings banks
Questionnaire 148 financial 
firms (1995)
Mian (1996) Evidence on corporate hedging policy Financial 3,022 firms (1992) USA
statements
Bodnar et al. (1996) 1995 Wharton survey of derivatives usage Survey (14%) 2,500 – no financial USA
by US non-financial firms firms (1995)
Tufano (1996) Who manages risk? An empirical Gold industry 48 firms USA
examination of risk management practices database (1990-1993)
in the gold mining industry
Downie et al.* The University of Waterloo survey of Survey No financial firms Canada
(1996) Canadian derivatives use and 
hedging activities
Venkatachalam Value relevance of banks’ Financial 99 financial firms USA
(1996) derivatives disclosures statements (1993-1994)
Geczy et al. (1997) Why firms use currency derivatives Financial 372  – no financial USA
statements firms (1990)
Berkman & An international comparison of Survey 124 NZ Stock New 
Bradbury (1997) derivatives use (answer 63.7%) Exchange (1996) Zealand
Admed et al (1997) Evidence on interest rate risk Financial 152 financial USA
management and derivatives usage statements firms (1994)
by commercial banks
Bodnar et al. (1998) 1998 Wharton survey of derivatives usage Survey 1,928 – no financial USA
by US non-financial firms (answer 20.7%) firms (1997)
Levich et al. (1999) 1998 Survey of derivatives and risk Survey (17.5%) 1,708 institutions USA
management practices by US (1998)
institutional investors
Carter & Sinkey The use of interest rate derivatives by end Financial Financial firms USA
(1998a) users: the case of large community banks statements (1990-1993)
(*) Smithson (Editor). Managing Financial Risk, Yearbook 1996, pp. 214-233.
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TABLE 5 (CONTINUATION).- RELATED LITERATURE
Author (Date) Publication Data Sample Research 
Resource (date) area
Treasury Management 1999 Survey of OTC derivatives use and Survey (10.13%) 4,000 TMA USA
Association (1999) risk management practices members (1999)
Bodnar & Gebhardt Derivatives usage in risk management by Survey (29.2%) 368 – no financial Germany
(1999) US and German non-financial firm: firms (1997)
a comparative study
Guay (1999) The impact of derivatives on firm risk: An Financial No financial firms USA
empirical examination of new derivatives users statements (1990-1994)
Whidbee & Wohar Derivative activities and managerial Financial 175 financial firms USA
(1999) incentives in the banking industry statements (1991)
Prevost et al. (2000) Derivatives usage and financial risk Survey (46.4%) 334 – no financial New 
management in large and small economies: firms (1998) Zealand
a comparative analysis
De Ceuster et al. A survey into the use of derivatives by large Survey (21.9%) 334 – no financial Belgium
(2000) non-financial firms operating in Belgium firms (1997)
Sinkey & Carter Evidence on the financial characteristics of Financial Financial firms USA
(2000) banks that do and do not use derivatives statements (1996)
Matolcsy & Petty Internal reporting of derivatives: Survey (36.6%) 94 – no financial Australia
(2001) Some Australian evidence firms
Sheedy (2001) Corporate use of derivatives in Hong Kong Survey (15% HK 131 – no financial Hong Kong 
and Singapore: a survey and 20% Singapore) firms Singapore
Marsden & Prevost Derivatives use, corporate governance Financial Listed firms New 
(2005) and legislative change: an empirical statements (1994-1997) Zealand
analysis of New Zealand listed companies
Some of these surveys15 (see Table 5) include questions to probe the level of centralised
decision-making, frequency in communication with management or with the board of
directors, or the frequency and mechanisms followed in the assessment of the derivatives
portfolio. Few studies (none within the financial sector) specifically focus on the necessary
internal control of derivatives that have been carried out.
In the literature reviewed there are just two studies that cover this issue in some depth.
The first, Chorafas’ work (1996) based on the author’s long experience as consultant
and risk manager and on his continuous relations with various firms, describes
different reporting and control practices. The second study, that of Matolcsy and Petty16
(2001), was based on the analysis of questionnaires sent to 93 of the top 100 firms17 in
Australia which provided information on the internal reporting and control of
derivatives in non-financial firms.
(15) See Bodnar et al. (1995, 1996, 1998 and 1999), Phillips (1995), Yanagida and Inui (1996), Downie et
al.(1996), Costa (1995), Alcarria (1995), Rubín (1996), Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Berkman et al.(1997),
Grant and Marshall (1997), Levich et al. (1999) and De Ceuster et al. (2000).
(16) In their work they listed previous studies on the internal control of derivatives focusing on exchange risk
management by multinationals (Collier and Davis, 1985; Collier et al., 1990) and those that focus on the
study of a particular company (Arnott, 1995; Adams, 1995).
(17) To find out more about the companies see http://www.group100.com.au.
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Matolcsy and Petty (2001) were concerned about information available to management and
internal control in terms of performances, reconciliation, confirmation and authorisation,
segregation of duties and assessment of derivatives. The authors admitted that, although
there was no ‘theory’ on internal controls and reporting of derivatives, the general points
gathered and the high profile losses on derivatives trading in the past enabled them to form
the following predictions (Matolcsy and Petty, 2001: 28):
- Companies would have well-established policies and procedures for trading derivatives.
- Companies would have appropriate reporting mechanisms to keep the board of
directors informed about their derivative trading, and
- Companies would continuously monitor the exposure of their derivatives.
The study, based on the 34 valid responses from the 93 questionnaires sent, concluded
with three fundamental results:
- About 80% of organisations had well-established accounting and administrative
policies and procedures for reporting and the control of the use of derivatives.
- The frequency of reporting on derivatives to boards and the internal/external auditing
of the use of derivatives was generally monthly – an interval that they consider to be
inconsistent with the nature and risks associated with many, if not all, derivatives.
- Only 50% (or less) of the organisations had some well-established procedures for
revaluing and assessing the risk associated with their use of derivatives and none of
these were monitored continuously.
Our objective is to survey if these questions, and other derived from the recommendations
and documents studied and commented in the previous section, are taken in account by
Spanish savings banks when using derivatives.
RESEARCH DESIGN
As it was stated earlier, the second aim of this paper is to provide evidence of the usage
and control of derivatives by Spanish savings banks through the established policies,
procedures and controls. For this purpose we developed the survey described below.
5
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5.1. Objectives and hypotheses
The objectives of our survey are:
- To determine if firms are using derivatives, to what purpose, and in the case of having
suffered losses to study their causes;
- To find out if firms have a formal policy on the activity of derivatives and how it is established;
- To analyse the mechanisms firms have planned and established to control this activity.
Besides, within these objectives we want to confirm the following hypothesis:
H1a: Firms using derivatives for speculative purposes are those who have suffered
more losses.
H1b: The losses suffered by using derivatives are due to the lack of control.
H2a: Firms using derivatives for speculative purposes have a formal policy in place to
regulate the correct functioning of these instruments.
H2b: Those firms which have suffered losses by using derivatives have a formal policy
in place to regulate the correct functioning of these instruments.
H3a: Firms using derivatives for speculative purposes have more mechanisms of control.
H3b: Those firms which have suffered losses by using derivatives have more
mechanisms of control.
5.2. Data selection and methodology used
Our empirical research was focused on savings banks, and as stated earlier, currently represent
half of the financial businesses in Spain. They have earned an undoubted legitimacy in the
economic field, establishing themselves in a key position in the development and modernisation
of the Spanish financial system, and contributing to both its efficiency and its stability.
This study covers all the Spanish savings banks, 46 financial firms, which were classified
by size, due to total deposits, into four groups18 (see Table 6). And as in the majority of the
studies mentioned earlier, we used questionnaires to collect the data.
According to the BCBS19, an internal audit includes the examination and evaluation of the
adequacy and effectiveness of the internal control systems. In practice20, this scope is
broad and covers such major areas as internal control systems.
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(18) However, we did not find statistical significance among the groups to indicate substantial differences in
the extent of derivatives usage and control. 
(19) In August 2001, BCBS issued its best practices paper, Internal audit in banks and the supervisor’s
relationship with auditors, highlighting the important work of internal auditors in banking organizations and
the need for cooperation between supervisors and banks’ internal and external auditors.
(20) As it can be observed in the survey carried out by BCBS in August 2002.
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The questionnaires (see appendix) were posted in December 2002 to the internal
auditing directors of the respective firms who were later contacted by email and
telephone. Data collection was finalised by March 2003. Each questionnaire was
accompanied by a cover letter outlining the study objectives, respondent confidentiality
and the availability of survey results upon request. It contained 34 questions in three
sections relating to the objectives outlined above. Each section contained a few detailed
questions relating to the issues.
Block I. Derivatives Usage: Questions 1 to 11.
Block II. Derivatives Policies: Questions 12 to 20.
Block III. Derivatives Control: Questions 21 to 34.
Apart from voluntary identification the surveys were anonymous.  The firms were only
asked to specify which group they belonged to, that is, classification by size on the criteria
we provided in an additional page. Only three firms specifically identified themselves,
which confirms and reinforces the degree of uncommunicativeness and secrecy that have
always characterised the financial system, based on the public’s trust.
For statistical analysis we used the descriptive statistic for the summary of the univariate
information. On some issues we were interested in going further, using statistical
inference, estimating relations between two variables through correlation matrices and
contingency tables which enabled us to determine both the independence condition and
quantify the degree of association between the aforementioned variables through Pearson’s
coefficient. To ensure that the values and differences observed are in fact significant, we
applied tests to contrast hypotheses, carrying out the Chi square statistic with the Yates
correlation in those cases where the number of responses were not sufficiently large. In
case of factors that could be linked to the size of the banks, we carried out Kruskal Wallis’
test for contrast, and if the result was insignificant it would enable us to extend and apply
other results obtained to the saving banks sector.
The responses received21 (see Table 6) provide a satisfactory level of replies, taking into
account, firstly, the average number replies in such studies, secondly that the information
requested is considered to be privileged and part of internal policy and thus confidential
and in third place, the resistance in accepting losses from derivatives.
Internal Control of Derivatives Usage by Spanish Savings Banks
(21) We would like to thank to our survey respondents for their cooperation in facilitating this research.
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SURVEY RESULTS
This section presents the empirical results of our investigation following the structure of
the questionnaire and the outlined objectives. 
6.1. Derivatives usage
We posed the following questions: Does your firm use derivatives? If not, why is that so?;
For what purpose does your firm use derivatives?; Has your firm incurred losses as a
consequence of its use?; and, If your firm has had losses, why has it occurred?
As we pointed out, virtually all reviewed empirical research reports a positive relation
between company size and derivatives usage, because size is positively associated with
economies of scale that reduce the direct costs of derivatives usage. However, 88% of
savings banks surveyed use derivatives22. Only four – all from smallest group D – state that
they had not used these instruments in their firms for the prominent reasons listed in
Figure 1. This result is somewhat higher than the estimate (61.5%) by Rubín (1996) for all
the financial firms corroborating the increased use of derivatives in the recent years and
thus providing greater interest for the conclusions in our study.
6
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TABLE 6.- DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION AND DATA FROM THE SAMPLE
GROUP A GROUP B GROUP C GROUP D
(Up €10,000 million)* (€10,000-4,000 million)* (€4,000-2,000 million)* (Less€2,000 million)*
Sent 10 12 12 12 46
Received 7 9 7 11 34
70% 75% 58% 92% 74%
Sample E= ± 8,8%   NC= 95%   Z= 1,96   p=q=0,5  
34 firms 
FIGURE 1.- REASONS FOR NOT USING DERIVATIVES (VALUATION 1 TO 5)
Lack of experience 4.5
Losses other entities 4.5
Lack of knowledge 4.25
3.75Concern for their usage and effects
3.25
Lack of means to
guarantee their control
(22) As derivatives are classified as off-balance sheet activities this activity is not registered on a bank’s
balance sheet and details are difficult to extract for research purposes such as ours. Nevertheless, experience
has shown that even those who invested in small quantities suffered great losses in the 1990s.
(*) Total deposits.
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Other important factor linked to the usage of these instruments is their purpose. All the
firms polled assert to use derivatives primarily to hedge their positions. However, on
occasions (46%) they also recognise to use derivatives for speculative purposes as
principal or second objective (see Figure 2).
Internal Control of Derivatives Usage by Spanish Savings Banks
FIGURE 2.- USING DERIVATIVES TO SPECULATE
40%
40%
20%
Never to speculate
Speculation as the second
reason of derivatives usage
Speculation as the principal
reason of derivatives usage
In this sense, there is a significant relationship (Pearson’s Chi-squared with the correction
of Yates α= 0.020) between the firms that suffered losses and those that speculate in
derivatives although the losses were not significant in all the cases.
These results confirm our hypothesis H1a although it is important to avoid the association
between a speculative use of derivatives and an incorrect or inadequate management, if
there is a correct control in place.
Regarding the losses, while derivatives are not risk-free, only 63% of firms admits to have
suffered losses from derivatives and only two of them consider losses to be significant. This
result confirms our view that those who did not respond to our questionnaire probably
suffered serious losses23.
Equally or more important than admission of losses and their extent or seriousness is the
ability to identify the cause or causes, since awareness would allow, if not their eradication,
then at least their reduction to more acceptable levels. However, what is clear is that those
affected do not attribute the main reasons for their loss to the complexity of the instruments,
the firm’s inadequate knowledge, or the lack of regulation. This result, when we apply the
Kruskal-Wallis test, could be generalised to apply to the sector under study.
Table 7 shows a strong correlation between three of these causes thus revealing the link
between the complexities, inadequate knowledge and lack of control of the instruments. 
(23) For example in 1995 Caja Granada (the savings bank of Granada) lost 6.685 million pesetas which led to
their creating an Internal Audit Department (see Expansion, 21 and 28 June 1995).
GROUP A
17%
67%
17%
GROUP B
25%
75%
GROUP C
57%
14%
29%
GROUP D
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Two other results should be noted. Firstly, the majority of firms look for external causes for
their loss – those responsible outside the firm or adverse market movements.  Secondly, 70%
do not attach importance to the lack of control as a cause either because they are confident
that all the necessary controls are in place or they do not see this as a significant factor.
Likewise, in spite of the risks and losses associated with derivatives, the sector as a whole
not only continued using them as indicated in 46.7% of the cases but there was a slight
increase of its use for 43.3% of case and 6.7% stated a heavy increase. 
So, we have to reject H1b. Firms do not link the losses incurred to the complexity,
inadequate knowledge or the lack of control of derivatives as posed in our hypothesis.
Rather, the firms tend to look for external reasons for their losses by blaming the
unpredictability of markets for their adverse results. 
6.2. Derivatives policies and procedures 
The key questions which we considered were the following: Does the firm have a set policy
with respect to the use of derivatives?; If those policies exist, how are they brought in?;
and, Is there adequate internal communication on this activity?
In spite of the losses and risks caused by derivatives, 43% of savings banks that usually
use these instruments do not have a formal policy for regulating and defining these
procedures within the firm. And it was precisely from 1996, as a result of the huge
financial disasters, that its use was undertaken and many firms considered the need to
bring in documented policies to define the use of derivatives.
There are no significant differences among the four groups in the study sample in this
regard. Apart from those in group A, where almost all have an established policy, with the
rest of the groups the firms that have a defined policy and those that do not are about even.
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TABLE 7.- CORRELATIONS AMONG CAUSES OF LOSSES
Misunderstanding Complexity
Misunderstanding Corr. Pearson
Sig. (bilateral)
Complexity Corr. Pearson 0.864**
Sig. (bilateral) 0.001
Lack of control Corr. Pearson 0.884** 0.877**
Sig. (bilateral) 0.002 0.001
** Correlation significant at 0.01 level (bilateral).
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In relation to our hypothesis H2a, there is no significant relation among those which had
experienced losses using derivatives and those which have a formal policy in place. So, we
cannot confirm H2a. 
However, there is a significant relationship (Pearson’s Chi-squared with the correction of
Yates α= 0,08) among those which use derivatives to speculate and those which have a
formal policy, so we can confirm our hypothesis H2b. (78,57% of respondents who use
derivatives to speculate had the policy established).
Besides this, some of the main findings regarding the policies and procedures defined by
the savings banks surveyed are the followings.
Firstly, all the staff of the firms in 94% of cases are aware of them. Secondly, there is
written evidence of them in 87% of cases. Thirdly, they include and attach importance to
most of the fundamental aspects that – in our opinion and those of the recommendations
and best practices published – are to strengthen management and the control of
derivatives activity (see Figure 3).
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FIGURE 3.- HIGHEST EVALUATED (1 TO 5) ASPECTS INCLUDED IN THE POLICIES
Contingency plans for market and crisis situations 3.25
Definition of roles and responsabilities 3.94
People who are allowed and authorized to operate derivatives 4
Who should be kept informed and frequency 4.35
The kind of derivatives allowed and authorized 4.35
The procedure established to approve the use of derivatives 4.35
Limits established and allowed 4.46
The strategy to follow 4.65
The majority of studies conducted among non-financial firms merely asked if a company
had a policy on derivatives activity and how frequently the Board of Directors was
informed about it.
We were also interested in finding out who is in charge of preparing, revising and updating
these policies (see Figure 4), who approves them (see Figure 5) and finally, how often were
these functions carried out (see Figure 6).
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FIGURE 4.- WHO ELABORATES, REVISES AND UPDATES THE POLICIES?
Board of Directors
26,3%
Senior Management
34,2%
Middle Management
23,7%
Others
13,2%
Internal Audit
2,6%
FIGURE 6.- FREQUENCY IN WHICH POLICIES ARE ELABORATED AND UPDATED
Annually
50%
Quarterly
7,9%
Monthly
31,6%
Daily
2,6%
Weekly
7,9%
FIGURE 5.- WHO APPROVES THE POLICY?
Note: COAP is the Committee of Assets and Liabilities
Board Board &
management
Board &
COAP
Management COAP
55,6%
22,2%
83%
5,6% 5,6%
11,1%
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Further, those firms that do have a defined policy include in it recommendations from
the best practices for the activity which were drawn up by management and approved by
the Board.
Regardless of whether a written policy on the use of derivatives does exist in the firm,
there is no doubt that internal reporting on this activity is a fundamental feature which
guarantees its correct use and control. For this reason we were interested in finding on the
use of derivatives in the organisation who was informed and how often.  On this issue we
found that:
- It is management (35.4%) followed by the Board (21.5%) who received information
about the development of the activity.
- The internal audit department also receives information (13.9%) about the situation
on derivatives.
- For the majority, the information is transmitted in the following frequency:  monthly
(41.8%), weekly (22.8%), and daily 21.5%. These figures are a little higher than those
observed by Matolcsy and Petty (2001) in non-financial firms where the information was
often transmitted monthly. 
- By cross-checking the information it is clear that while communication with the Board
ranges from monthly to annually, information transmitted to management is more
frequent, in most cases weekly or even daily.
With regard to the levels of responsibility being informed, the two aspects for which most
information is transmitted (see Figure 7) are on the positions taken and the risks assumed.
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FIGURE 7.- TYPE OF INFORMATION GIVEN ON DERIVATIVES
Risks assumed
26,7%
Open positions
29,8%
Ghanges perceived
16,4%
Others
5,3%
Latent losses
21,8%
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So, as it is recommended by different authorities and international bodies, management is
in most cases the first to be informed about the situation of derivatives, although in our
opinion, frequency should be daily or weekly for a greater percentage.
6.3. Derivatives control
The third part of the survey was directed at finding out the mechanisms of established or
planned controls in the firms and we raised were the following key questions: Is there
control on derivatives activity?; What is it like? What is controlled and who carries it out?;
and, What role does the internal and external audit play?
Among savings banks 70% have a specific department for risk control. Although its name
and level of dependence varies from firm to firm, it shares the same functions and its
presence is more common in larger savings banks with greater resources as Pearson’s Chi-
square coefficient with Yates correction (α= 0.022) corroborates. 
Surprisingly, despite of the risks and difficulties inherent in these instruments, this does not
indicate that firms exert more control over them as one would have expected, since 48%
affirm that they do not conduct a more thorough control compared to other instruments. 
In relation to our hypothesis H3a, there is no significant relation among those which had
experienced losses using derivatives and those which have a department for risk control or
carry out a more thorough control over derivatives compared to other instruments. So, we
cannot confirm H3a. 
However, we found that there is a significant relationship (Pearson’s Chi-squared with the
correction of Yates a = 0,01) among those which use derivatives to speculate and those
which carry out a more thorough control over derivatives compared to other instruments,
so we can confirm our hypothesis H3b.
Besides these contrasts, other findings about derivatives control in Spanish savings banks
that we would like to point out are the followings.
What does have a greater acceptance as confirmed by Rubín (1996: 347) is that the limits
should always be established by the firm itself (85.3%) according to its knowledge or
resources, and not by an external regulator.
As best practices establish, the first basic rule of a sound internal control system is an
adequate segregation of duties and the absence of this segregation was the direct cause of
many financial disasters referred to above. For this reason the high number of savings
banks (31,57% of respondents) with a specific derivatives trading department to control
A. Fernández-Laviada, F. J. Martínez-García y J. Montoya
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the activity attracted our attention. Rubín (1996) noted this and that it was higher in
savings banks than other banks. Our survey though with a lower figure confirm her finding.
When we further analysed this by size (see Figure 8) we found that in the larger savings
banks derivative trading was either controlled by the risks department or delegated to the
auditing department and in smaller firms (29%) it was done by the internal audit
department or the derivatives trading department itself.
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FIGURE 8.- WHO CONTROLS DERIVATIVE ACTIVITIES?
29% 29% 43%
11% 22% 33% 33%
20%  10% 50% 20%
GROUP D
GROUP C
GROUP B
22% 11% 67%GROUP A
Internal Audit Department Trading Department Risk Department Others
Similarly, another aspect dealt with in the surveys and one of the conclusions which stood
out most in Matolcsy and Petty (2001)’s study was the low frequency on valuation of the
portfolios. In our study we have been able to prove that in the savings banks this valuation
is done either daily (43.1%) or monthly (37.3%) and the information is communicated to
the intermediate managers (41.2%) and particularly to the department or area in charge of
risk control (31.4%) included under the heading ‘others’.
On the other hand, firms could manage the counter-party credit risk of their derivatives
activities by setting a minimum credit rating for each derivative transaction. In Bodnar’s
studies (1995, 1996, 1998 and 1999), particularly the 1998 survey, 25% of non-financial
firms demanded a credit rating of AA or higher for maturities less than a year, increasing
to 40% for maturities greater than 12 months. In our case, the levels are higher: 33.3% for
maturities less than a year and 45.8% for those ranging between 1 and 5 years. However,
what is surprising is the high percentage of firms that have no set policy on counter-party
credit ratings which could increase their risk unnecessarily (see Figure 9). 
Lastly, we wanted to assess which type of control or procedures firms have planned and
established within their organisations to ensure this activity works well. 
Figure 10 shows the average valuations given by the firms. We can conclude that the most
important thing for them is to ensure that no unauthorised operation is undertaken. But
should they occur there are the necessary mechanisms for a prompt detection of any
irregularity and the application of appropriate measures.
127-164Internal_control  21/5/08  13:31  Página 151
152
Firms proclaim that almost all of controls are included in their organisations. However,
some express the need to reinforce them, since the size of the firm and the reduced
dimension of the operations carried out sometimes prevent them from maintaining the
correct segregation of duties between those who deal and those who supervise, over and
above the valuations obtained being high.
Finally, in relation to the audit role, in spite of the fact that in some firms the internal audit
department carries out the main role, that is, being directly in charge of risk control or
supervising the department of the corresponding risk control, in the majority it basically
takes on the role of supervision. Thus 79.35% of the answers state that within the audit
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FIGURE 9.- COUNTER-PARTY RATING
50%
16,7%
33,3%
Not forecast
BBB
AA
AAA
Mat < 1 year
41,7%
8,3%
45,8%
4,2%
Mat > 1 year < 5
41,7%
8,3%
29,2%
20,8%
Mat > 5 years
FIGURE 10.- IMPORTANCE OF THE EXISTENCE OF CONTROLS FOR THE FOLLOWING PURPOSES
(VALUATION 1 TO 5)
Just authorized decisions and operations are carried out 4.92
Non-authorized operations are quickly detected in order 4.87
to take the right measures
Established limits are complied with and those exceeded 4.67
are monitored and authorized
Norms and existing regulations are complied with 4.28
Responsabilities between front and back office are 4.17
adequately segregated
Necessary reconciliations take place between those who 4.16
operate and those who register the operations
Operations are confirmed independently 4.09
Operations take place with authorized brokers 4.04
Evaluations are revised 4
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programme they include the revision of the derivatives activity. And the frequency with
which this revision is done varies considerably, depending on the function carried out in
each firm, but nearly 40% do it continuously whilst external auditors limit themselves to
doing one annual revision in 82.8% of the cases studied.
The internal audit together with the Audit Committee, where there is one, check the use
and exposure of derivatives, although this is not particularly common. Only 30% of firms
stated that its Committee checked the activity and, also, they do it with less frequency,
normally once in six months (42.9%) or a year (42.9%).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Derivatives are one of the most widespread instruments for risk management amongst
financial firms as revealed in the savings banks polled. The use of these instruments
continues to increase either purely as a means of hedging or to obtain higher revenue,
widening its exposure to risk. However, the enormous losses suffered by the firms as a
consequence of wrong usage and the duality of risk (Ciborra, 2004) have not only
questioned its usefulness but has spurred an interest in necessary control.
The aim of this paper was twofold. Firstly, to study and analyse the importance and need
of internal control in derivatives usage. Although the debate about its regulation and
control is still open, we believe that a sound internal control could avoid new debacles
without adding other restrictions to the market. So, we reviewed the main issued
recommendations, rules, norms, regulation and the academic literature related to internal
control of derivatives.
Secondly, we aimed to survey the usage and control of derivatives by Spanish savings
banks. So, after our review, we prepared and sent a questionnaire which provided us the
following evidence.
Regarding their usage, the lack of experience and adequate knowledge as well as the
incurred losses are the three main constraints on its use by the savings banks studied.
However, the firms which use them do not relate the incurred losses to the complexity or
difficulty of derivatives or the lack of or mistakes in control. If anything, they consider that
there is sufficient control and attribute losses to adverse market movements.
Although the losses were not significant, there is a positive relationship between the firms
that suffered losses and those that speculate in derivatives, what, in any case, does mean
that there is an association between a speculative use of derivatives and an incorrect or
inadequate management. 
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Referred to the policies and procedures, many of them, although they had suffered losses,
do not have a formal policy that regulates or establishes how it should be carried out within
the firm. We confirmed that there is a significant relation among those who use derivatives
to speculate and those who have a formal policy in place, but we could not confirm that
there is a relation among those who had suffered losses using them.
Besides, in the savings banks studied, it is often the senior management together with the
Board of Directors who are responsible for drawing up, revising and updating the policy as
well as the strategies to be pursued in the activity. These are drawn according to suggested
best practices and cover reporting, disclosures and communication with the staff involved.
Internal reporting, as far as this operation is concerned, is a key element for its control.
Both the Board of Directors and senior management are informed of the risks and positions
taken as well as any other information necessary for appropriate decisions. However the
frequency with which they receive all information is not always adequate.
Finally, referred to their control, despite the complexity and the risks associated with these
instruments, we could not confirm that the studied firms have greater measures of control
in the case of having suffered losses. However, we confirmed that there is a significant
relation among those which use derivatives for speculative reasons and those who conduct
a more thorough control compared to other instruments.
Most of the savings banks state that they have nearly all the adequate controls planned
and included in their organisation. Some admit the need to strengthen their control
mechanisms but are hampered by their limited size. Others do not link the huge
financial disasters to an inadequate internal control system that lack segregation of
duties, reporting, and monitoring amongst other things. In addition, as a reinforcement
and support mechanism for control, the internal audit carries out a fundamental role in
the savings banks, supervising and in many of them even controlling the activity of
derivatives itself.
At last, although the segregation of duties has been one of the main causes identified in
the related scandals, there are still many aspects that should be overseen by a risk control
department rather than a derivatives trading department that has to control its own activity.
Similarly, a high percentage of those polled have not planned the solvency demanded from
its counter-parties, thus increasing the risks of the operation. 
We conclude with two comments on our study relating to restricted access to more
detailed information on investments in derivatives as until now there is no legal
obligation to disclose such investments. But it is likely that those firms without a formal
control policy have a lower rate of derivatives usage or that they use them mainly to
hedge their positions. 
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If this is the case, then the absence of such policies would be less important. However, we
should bear in mind that this market is undergoing rapid growth and an increased
efficiency would require the use of these instruments for various purposes with all the
mechanism in place.
Additionally, since we lack detailed information about the derivatives market, we cannot
be fully certain about the relative weight of the savings banks in this market. However,
although the concentration of derivatives activities in the larger commercial banks is well
known, we believe that the outstanding role of savings banks in Spain, which are under the
same regulation system as the commercial banks, validate the general interest of the
survey results.
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APPENDIX
A. Fernández-Laviada, F. J. Martínez-García y J. Montoya
I. USE OF DERIVATIVES
1. Is the use of  derivatives allowed in your firm?
2. Have you planned to use them in the future? Near future?
3. Was it allowed in the past?
4. What was the purpose of  its use?
Hedging
Main purpose Secondary Never used with that purpose
Speculation
5. Assess which of   the following causes was more important when  deciding not to use or  stop using derivatives.
Risk exposure toyour firm is low
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No N/C
No
6. If  one of  the causes were the losses, assess the extent to which those losses influenced the following aspects
Lack of  knowledge about the instruments and their consequences
Lack of  control in its use, which allowed
Mistake in the hedging
Complexity of  the  instruments
Mistake with counterparty
Lack of  regulation
Other causes:
Lack of  limits on the activity
Non-authorised personnel to workNon- authorised activities to take place
The limits stablished were exceeded
without having knowledge of  it
Adverse movements in the market
If  the answer is yes, go to question 7
Losses suffered in the past with these instruments in your company
Concern about the obligation to reveal information on its use
Lack of  experience with derivatives
Risk exposure is managed by other means
Concern about its use and possible effects
Lack of  knowledge or understanding about these instruments
Concern about how supervisors, shareholders, regulators and others perceive these instruments
Losses suffered and/or observed in the past in other firms
Noticeable increase of  the risks linked with its use
Lack of  means to guarantee its control and adequate  supervision
Other:
7. What is the purpose of  use them?
From question 1
8. Has your firm suffered losses due to the use of  derivatives? Yes No I do not know
 9. How would you classify those losses? Low Moderate Very seriousSerious
SURVEY ON INTERNAL CONTROL
UNIVERSITY OF CANTABRIA
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT
(Assess on a scale from 1 to 5:    1= least  important, 5= most important)
PLEASE, SEND US THE SURVEY IN THE POSTAGE-PAID
ENVELOPE, EVEN IF YOU CANNOT CONTINUE FILLING IT IN. THANK YOU
WHICH  GROUP
DOES YOUR FIRM BELONG TO?
(See explanation sheet attacht)
A B C D
30 4
1
60
50
1,75
4,75
1,00
4,50
4,25
4,50
3,25
3,75
1,75
1,50
3,00
30
4
0
10
0
6
19 11 0
13 5 0 2
(Assess on a scale from 1 to 5:    1= least important, 5= most important)
Hedging
Main purpose Secondary
Never used with that purpose
Speculation
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II. POLICIES ON DERIVATIVES
10. Assess which is/are the causes that allowed or produced these losses
Lack of   knowledge about the instruments and their consequences
Lack of   control in its use, which allowed:
Mistake in the hedging
Exceeding the limits established without having knowledge of  it
Other causes
Complexity of  the tools
Adverse movements in the market
No limits set on the  activities
Lack of  regulation
Non-authorized activities to take place
Mistake with counterparty
Actions from non-authorised staff
11. How do you expect your derivatives usage to change over the next year?
Decrease a lot Decrease slightly Increase slightly Increase a lotNo change
12. Does your firm have a written policy covering  the use of  derivatives?
 Since when?
Yes No
If your answer is no,
 go to question 19
 13. Assess the importance of  the following aspects that are included and dealt with  in those policies
Strategy to be pursued or aim with which the  different types of  derivatives are authorised
The people who can or are authorised to carry out transactions with derivatives
Contingency plans for markets or crisis situations
For maturities
For type of  risk (market, credit, operational, legal, etc.)
The person or people who should be informed and the periodicity of  the reports
Other:
Type of  derivatives that are allowed or authorised (OTC, regulators,...)
For volume of  negotiation
Limits established and allowed:
Other:
The process established to approve or use derivatives
Description of  functions or responsabilities
For counterparty
For type of  instruments
 14. Who is in charge of  drawing up, checking and updating the policies? And, how frequently is it done?
Annually
 Board of  directors
Senior Management
Middle management
Internal Audit
Other: who?
Quarterly Monthly Weekly Daily
Other
1,70
2,18
2,00
1,42
2,12
1,42
1,42
3,56
2,08
1,63
1,60
0 1 14 13 2
17 13
4,65
4,35
4,00
4,35
3,25
3,94
4,46
4,14
3,68
4,00
3,43
4,25
4,35
8
6
3
0
2
1
1
1
0
0
1
6
2
1
2
0
0
2
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
(Assess on a scale from 1 to 5:    1= least important, 5= most important)
(Assess on a scale from 0 to 5: 0= Not included in the policies, 1= least important, 5= most important)
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19. Who, and how frequently are they  informed about derivatives activity?
15. Who approves and  authorises these policies?
16. Is there an internal control manual of Treasury’s activities?
17. Do the staff  involved in derivatives activity know about this policy?
18. Is there any evidence to suggest that  it has been handed in to those involved involved?
Board of  Directors Senior  management Other: who?
Yes
Yes
No
No
N/A
From question 12
 20. What aspects are they informed about? Risks
accepted
Position
taken
Changes
perceived
Other,
which?
III. DERIVATIVES CONTROL
21. Does your firm have a risk control department?
 23. Do you carry out a more thorough  control over derivatives compared to other instruments?
24. Who do you think should set the limits of  derivatives operations?
25. Who is responsible for derivatives control in your firm?
22. What is it called? What are its functions? And, Who is responsible for it?
How is it carried out?
Yes
Yes
Bank of  Spain
Department of
Internal Audit.
No
No
The firm itself
Audit
Committee
Other: who?
Other: who?
Derivatives Trading
Department
Risks Control
Department
26. What  is the lowest rated counterparty with which you will enter a derivative transaction?
Maturities less than a year
Maturities between 1 and 5 years
Maturities beyond 5 years
AAA AA BBB Less than BBB
Not
set Policy
P&G
Latent
Yes No
14 6 2
15 2 0
15 1
14 2
3
0
0
3
1
4
0
0
0
0
10
10
4
5
4
0
12
2
2
2
0
6
8
1
2
14
23
8
9
6
14
25
11
10
7
7
15
6
5
4
11
18
8
7
5
2
3
2
1
4
21 9
13 12
3 29 2
7 0 6 17
5
5
1
0 8
11
7
4
2
2
0
0
0
12
10
10
Annually
 Board of  Directors
Senior Management
Middle Management
Internal Audit
Other: who?
Monthly Weekly DailyQuarterly
 Board of  Directors
Senior Management
Other: who?
Middle Management
Internal Audit
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27. Who assesses your derivatives portfolio? And, how frequently is it done?
28. State and assess, if  there are controls and procedures that guarantee...
Yes No
Only decissions made  and authorised  operations are carried out
The limits establisheds are respected with and those exceeded are authorised and supervised
The necessary reconciliation between those who operate and those who register the operations
Norms and regulations are being respected
Non-authorised operations are detected quickly to take the appropriate measures
Functions of  front/back office are adequately separated
Other:
Valuations are checked
Operations are confirmed independently
Only work with authorised brokers
29. Do internal auditors within the program check the usage and situation of  derivative? Yes No
30. If you answered yes to question 29, how frequently are they checked?
 31. Does the Audit Committee check derivatives usage and risk exposure?
32. If you answered yes to question 31, how frequently are they checked?
If you wish to add any comment, observation or suggestion to this study,
we would be pleased to include themt  in the results
PLEASE, SEND US THE SURVEY  IN THE ATTACHED POSTAGE-PAID  ENVELOPE.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION.
Continually
Yes
Six-monthly
Six-monthly
No
Annually
Annually N/A
34. Is there any internal Code of  Conduct? Yes No
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
00
0
0
9
2
3
9
4
12
1
2
2
1
0
1
1
0
1
29
27
28
28
30
27
28
28
28
4,00
4,16
4,09
4,04
4,92
4,87
4,67
4,17
4,28
23 6
9 6 8
7 16
1 3 3 0
0 2 24 3
24 4
Annually
Board of  Directors
Senior Management
Other: who?
Monthly Weekly DailyQuarterly
 33. How frequently do External Auditors whitin the program check derivatives usage and risk exposure?
Six-monthly Annually N/A
Importance
Continually
Continually
Middle Management
Internal Audit
(Assess on a scale from 1 to 5:    1= least important, 5= most important)
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